This paper analyzes the economic effects of agricultural price and merchandise trade policies around the world as of 2004 on global markets, net farm incomes, and national and regional economic welfare and poverty, using the global economy wide Linkage Model, new estimates of agricultural price distortions for developing countries, and a poverty elasticities approach. It addresses two questions: To what extent are policies as of 2004 still reducing rewards from farming in developing countries and thereby adding to inequality across countries in farm household incomes? Are they depressing value added more in primary agriculture than in the rest of the economy of developing countries, and earnings of unskilled workers more than of owners of other factors of production, thereby potentially contributing to inequality and poverty within developing countries (given that farm incomes are well below non-farm incomes in most developing countries and that agriculture there is intensive in the use of unskilled labor)? Results are presented for the key countries and regions of the world and for the world as a whole. They reveal that, by moving to free markets, income inequality between countries would be reduced at least slightly, all but one-sixth of the gains to developing countries would come from agricultural policy reform, unskilled workers in developing countries -the majority of whom work on farms -would benefit most from reform, net farm incomes in developing countries would rise by 6 percent compared with 2 percent for non-agricultural value added, and the number of people surviving on less than US$1 a day would drop 3 percent globally. Now is an appropriate time to address this set of questions for at least three reasons. One is that the World Trade Organization (WTO) is struggling to conclude the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations, and agricultural policy reform is once again one of the most contentious issues in those talks. Another is that poorer countries and their development partners
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Despite much reform over the past quarter of a century in policy distortions to agricultural incentives, many intervention measures remain (Anderson 2009) . A question of great interest to the agricultural, trade, and development policy communities in many developing countries and international agencies is: How do those policies affect economic welfare, inequality and poverty levels? More specifically, for any developing country of interest, how important are its own policies as compared with those of the rest of the world in affecting the welfare of the poor in that country; and, given that three-quarters of the world's poor depend on agriculture directly or indirectly for their livelihood (World Bank 2008) , and an earlier finding that farm policies as of 2001 were responsible for more than three-fifths of the global welfare cost of trade distortions (Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 2006) , what contributions do agricultural policies in particular contribute to those outcomes?
Now is an appropriate time to address this set of questions for at least three reasons. One is that the World Trade Organization (WTO) is struggling to conclude the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations, and agricultural policy reform is once again one of the most contentious issues in those talks. Another is that poorer countries and their development partners are striving to achieve their United Nations-encouraged Millennium Development Goals by 2015, the prime ones being the alleviation of hunger and poverty. And third, a new set of estimates of distortions to agricultural incentives in many countries has been brought together recently by the World Bank , and those estimates in turn have been expressed as an alternative set of price distortions for using in CGE models . This latter set differs from the usual ones used by trade modelers in that it is based on direct domestic-to-border price comparisons rather than (as with the GTAP dataset, see Badri Narayanan and Walmsley 2008) on just applied rates of import tariffs.
This chapter serves two purposes. The first is to analyze the economic effects of agricultural price and merchandise trade policies around the world as of 2004 on global markets, net farm incomes, and national and regional economic welfare and poverty. That is, it assesses how far the world still has to go in removing the disarray in world agriculture (to use the title of the seminal study by Johnson 1991) , and to at least provide a crude indication of the poverty that could be alleviated by such a reform. In doing so this chapter also serves a second purpose, which is to explain the origin of the exogenous shocks used in the global modeling of the following chapter and in the national modeling studies in part II to IV of this volume to represent the market effects on particular developing countries of rest-of-world agricultural and trade policies.
To quantify the impacts of current policies, we first amend the distortions in Version 7 of the GTAP global protection database (Badri Narayanan and Walmsley 2008) by replacing its applied tariffs with distortion rates that reproduce those estimated by authors of the developing country case studies in the World Bank's recent Agricultural Distortion research project as collated by .
1 Those distortion estimates suggest that, despite reforms of the past 25 years, there was still a considerable range of rates across commodities and countries in 2004, including a strong anti-trade bias in national agricultural and trade policies for many developing countries. Furthermore, non-agricultural protectionism is still rife in some developing countries, and agricultural price supports in some high-income countries remain high.
The present analysis addresses the following two questions: To what extent are policies as of 2004 still reducing rewards from farming in developing countries and thereby adding to inequality across countries in farm household incomes? Are they depressing value added more in primary agriculture than in the rest of the economy of developing countries, and earnings of unskilled workers more than of owners of other factors of production, thereby potentially contributing to inequality and poverty within those developing countries (given that farm incomes are well below non-farm incomes in most developing countries and that agriculture there is intensive in the use of unskilled labor)?
1 That distortions database is documented fully in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) and is based on the methodology summarized in Anderson et al. (2008a and 2008b provided by various policy instruments as calibrated in , the emphasis being mainly on import tariffs in the case of non-farm products but, in the case of agriculture, the full range of production, consumption and trade taxes and subsidies. This is followed by a description of the LINKAGE model of the global economy to be used to analyze the consequences of removing those distortions. The key results of the two simulations are then presented: full global liberalization of markets for all merchandise, and -so as to see the relative contribution of farm policies to those outcomes -full global reform of just agricultural policies. The chapter concludes by highlighting the main messages that emerge from the results. They are that, by moving to free markets, income inequality between countries would be reduced at least slightly, all but one-sixth of the gains to developing countries would come from agricultural policy reform, unskilled workers in developing countries -the majority of whom work on farms 2 Some of the questions raised here were addressed by Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006) who use the same Linkage model as in the present analysis, and by Anderson and Valenzuela (2007a) using the GTAP-AGR model, but in each case those authors relied on the GTAP Version 6 protection database for 2001 that included only applied import tariffs for developing countries).
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-would benefit most from reform, net farm incomes in developing countries would rise by 6 percent compared with 2 percent for non-agricultural value added, and the number of people surviving on less than US$1 a day would drop by 3 percent globally.
Key Distortions in Global Markets
Border measures traditionally have been the main means by which governments distort prices in their domestic markets for tradable products, with the relative prices of the various goods being affected by trade taxes or subsidies. Product-specific domestic output or farm input subsidies have played a more limited role, in part because of their much greater overt cost to the treasury.
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To quantify the impacts current policies, we use the Altertax procedure (Malcolm 1998) to amend the distortions in the pre-release of Version 7 of the GTAP global protection database.
The amendments are mainly for developing countries but, following Anderson and Valenzuela (2007b) , we also alter cotton distortions in the United States to better reflect policies there. To simplify the discussion below, European transition economies (in which we include Turkey) are treated as one of the world's developing country regions, the others being Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In principle services trade and foreign investment distortions also could distort incentives in the agricultural and industrial sectors, but they are ignored here because much controversy still surrounds their measurement and how they should be modeled. This is reflected in the results emerging from attempts to include services distortions in trade reform modeling, which have led to widely differing results. Compare, for example, Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2003) , Francois, van Meijl and van Tongeren (2005) , and Hertel and Keeney (2006) . Bank 2002 Bank , 2004 Bank , 2005 Bank , 2006 Bank , 2007 . It is a relatively straightforward CGE model but with some characteristics that distinguish it from other comparative static models such as the GTAP model (described in Hertel 1997) . Factor stocks are fixed, which means in the case of labor that the extent of unemployment (if any) in the baseline remains unchanged. Producers minimize costs subject to constant returns to scale production technology, consumers maximize utility, and all markets -including for labor -are cleared with flexible prices. There are three types of production structures. Crop sectors reflect the substitution possibilities between extensive and intensive farming; livestock sectors reflect the substitution possibilities between pasture and intensive feeding; and all other sectors reflect standard capital/labor substitution. There are two types of labor, skilled and unskilled, and the total employment of each is assumed fixed (so no change in their unemployment levels) but both are assumed to be intersectorally mobile. There is a single representative household per modeled region, allocating income to consumption using the extended linear expenditure system. Trade is modeled using a nested Armington structure in which aggregate import demand is the outcome of allocating domestic absorption between domestic goods and aggregate imports, and then aggregate import demand is allocated across source countries to determine the bilateral trade flows. A virtue of beginning with the latest GTAP database is that it includes bilateral tariffs that capture not only reciprocal but also non-reciprocal preferential trade agreements, the latter providing low-income exporters duty-free access to protected high-income country markets. This allows us to take into account the fact that future reform may cause a decline in the international terms of trade for those developing countries that are enjoying preferential access to agricultural and other markets of high-income countries (in addition to those that are net food importers because their comparative advantage is in other sectors such as labor-intensive manufacturing).
The version of the LINKAGE model used for this study is based on an aggregation The size of the Armington elasticities matters, see Valenzuela, Anderson and Hertel (2008) and Zhang (2009) . The Linkage model assumes larger values than some other models because it is seeking to estimate long-run consequences of liberalization. An example of the difference this can make to the results is detailed in Anderson and Martin (2006, The results below are comparative static results, so they do not include the (often much larger) dynamic gains that result from an acceleration in investment due to the reduction in tariffs on industrial goods lowering the cost of investment. Also missing, therefore, are any costs of adjustment to reform. And because this version of the Linkage Model assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale, it captures none of the benefits of freeing markets that could come from accelerated productivity growth, scale economies, and the creation of new markets (extensification vs. intensification). There is also a dampening effect on estimates of welfare gains because of product and regional aggregation, which hides many of the differences across products in rates of distortions. The results therefore should be treated as providing very much lower-bound estimates of the net economic welfare benefits from policy reform.
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Prospective Effects of Global Removal of Price-Distorting Policies
To see what could result from removing policies as of 2004, we examine in this section the results from two modeling simulations. The main one involves the full global liberalization of both agricultural policies and non-agricultural goods trade policies. An additional simulation, which liberalizes just agricultural policies globally, is also discussed towards the end of this section, to give a sense of the relative contribution to various outcomes of farm policies alone.
Global and national economic welfare
Beginning with the baseline projection of the world economy in 2004, all agricultural subsidies and taxes plus import tariffs on other merchandise, as summarized in table 1, 10 are removed globally. Our LINKAGE model suggests that would lead to a global gain of $168 billion per year (table 2) . As a share of national income, developing countries would gain nearly twice as much as high-income countries by completing that reform process (an average increase of 0.9 percent compared with 0.5 percent for high-income countries). Thus in this broad sense of a world of just two large country groups, completing the global reform process would reduce international inequality -to use the Milanovic (2005) term, taking into account each country's economic size. 11 The results vary widely across developing countries, however, ranging from slight losses in the case of some South Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries that would suffer exceptionally large adverse terms of trade changes to 8 percent increases in the case of Ecuador (whose main export item, bananas is currently heavily discriminated against in the EU market where former colonies and least developed countries enjoy preferential duty-free access).
If one were to treat each of the 60 regions in table 2 as able to be represented by a single household (that is, ignoring intra-region inequality), income inequality between countries as measured by the Gini Coefficient would be reduced at least slightly, from 0.8513 to 0.8506.
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The second column of numbers and those in parentheses in table 2 show the amount of that welfare gain due to changes in the international terms of trade for each country. For 10 developing countries as a group the terms of trade effect is slightly negative, and conversely for high-income countries.
Regional and sectoral distribution of welfare effects
One way to way to decompose the real income gains from full removal of price distortions globally, so as to better understand the sources for each region, is to assess the impacts of 
Quantities produced and traded
The full global liberalization results suggest there would be little change in the developing countries' aggregate shares of global output and exports of non-farm products other than for textiles and apparel. Their shares in agricultural and processed food markets, however, change noticeably: the export share rises from 54 to 64 percent and the output share rises from 46 to 50 percent. More significantly, the rises occur in nearly all agricultural and food industries. As a result, the share of global production of farm products that is exported rises dramatically for many industries and, for the sector as a whole, increases from 8 to 13 percent excluding intra-EU trade (table 4) . That 'thickening' of international food markets would have a substantial dampening effect on the instability of prices and quantities traded in those markets. (table 7) .
As already mentioned, such reform also raises substantially the share of agricultural and food production that is exported globally, thereby 'thickening' international markets, which would dampen international food price fluctuations and thereby reduce concerns about vulnerability to import dependence. The extent of this global public good aspect of agricultural and trade reform can be sensed for different products from the results reported in tables 8. Highly protected sugar and milk, as well as grains and oilseeds, are especially noteworthy. Also noteworthy from that table is the extent to which the developing country shares of output exported rise for certain products. The share of their grain production that is exported would double, and for meat it would more than double while for sugar it would rise nearly four-fold.
Global exports of cotton (plant-based fibers) would become more dominated by developing countries as the share of high-income cotton production exported would fall from 50 to 31 percent.
Effects on product and factor prices
The average real international prices of agricultural and lightly processed food products would be only 1. The redistributions of welfare among groups within each country following trade reform can be much larger than the aggregate change, partly because of the impacts on real pre-tax rewards to labor, capital and land. Those effects are reported in table 10, where factor rewards are deflated by the overall consumer price index (CPI) and also, in the case of unskilled wages, by the food and the food plus clothing CPIs (since those items are so prominent in the spending of unskilled workers). Consistent with trade theory, those results suggest unskilled workers in developing countries -the majority of whom work on farms -would benefit most from reform, followed by skilled workers, then capital owners. Returns to immobile agricultural land also rise in developing countries, but by less than for more-mobile factors. Land returns fall substantially in highly-protected Western Europe and Japan, change little in the United States, rise considerably in Australia and Canada and rise dramatically in dairy-intensive New Zealand.
Effects on sectoral value added
Also of crucial interest in terms of these policies' impact on inequality and poverty is how they affect value added in agriculture, in other words net farm income. These results for full global reform are reported in the first four columns of , and that in turn would boost production and employment of non-tradable goods and services. Net farm incomes are estimated to fall also in South Asia (by 7 percent), but there it is textiles and clothing that would expand (raising self-sufficiency from 144 to 153 percent) and, in India where the skilled/unskilled wage differential rises, also skill-intensive goods and services production.
Effects on poverty using the elasticities approach
The above results for real factor rewards and net farm income suggest both inequality and poverty could be alleviated globally by agricultural and trade policy liberalization. It is possible to go a step or two further in assessing reform impacts on poverty with a global model, even with only one single representative household per country. That involves using the elasticities approach, which is employed here in two ways. The first involves taking the impact on real household income, applying an estimated income to poverty elasticity, and then assessing the impacts on the poverty headcount index for each country. This simple approach assumes distributional neutrality: the poor receive the same proportional increase in real income as the average household in the economy, and all are subject to the same higher rate of direct income taxation to replace the customs revenue forgone because of trade liberalization.
A slightly more complex but more reasonable approach is to link key model variables to the possible change in the average per capita consumption of the poor, that is, to capture from the model's results some of the distributional aspects of the changes in real income, rather than simply the average gain. This has been done by calculating the change in the (pre-tax) average wage of unskilled workers deflated by the food and clothing CPI-presumably the most relevant consumer prices for the poor, including those many poor farm and other rural households that 14 earn most of their income from wages and are net buyers of food. These workers are assumed to be exempt from the direct income tax imposed to replace the lost customs revenue following trade reform-a realistic assumption for many developing countries.
13 Table 12 summarizes the key poverty results to emerge from the global reform scenario using both of these approaches. As is clear from the comparison, the more-naïve first approach yields little change in poverty numbers, so we concentrate attention here on the results generated using the more realistic second approach.
Under the full merchandise trade reform scenario, extreme poverty (the number of people surviving on less than US$1 a day) in developing countries would drop by 26 million relative to the baseline level of just under one billion, a reduction of 2.7 percent. The proportional reduction in China is much higher than in other developing countries, though: 3.7 percent compared with 2.6 percent. This would continue the trend of the recent past, with China being the region where poverty alleviation has been most numerous (see Ravallion 2007, 2008) . Nonetheless, in this scenario the number of extreme poor in Sub-Saharan Africa would fall by 3.7 percent. In India (though not in the rest of South Asia), by contrast, the number of extreme poor is estimated to rise, by 4.0 percent.
Recall that this set of poverty calculations is based on the change in the real wage of unskilled workers, deflated by the food and clothing CPI. The average change in the real unskilled wage over all developing countries is 5.9 percent-six times greater than the average net income increase in developing countries (after raising direct taxes to compensate for the loss of tariff revenue), assuming that the change in unskilled wages is fully passed through to households. This suggests such reform would deliver a marked reduction in income inequality within developing countries on average.
Under the broader definition of poverty-those living on no more than US$2 per daythe number of poor in developing countries would fall by 87 million under the full reform scenario compared to an aggregate baseline level of nearly 2.5 billion. This represents a somewhat larger proportionate reduction in the number of poor in developing countries, of 3.4 percent, or 3.7 percent if China is excluded. The proportionate decline in Sub-Saharan Africa is 2.7 percent, while for India there is still an increase, of 1.7 percent.
15
Caveats
As with all modeling, the results depend on the assumptions made in structuring the model. Of particular relevance here is that several assumptions bias downwards the estimates of welfare gains from trade. They include constant (rather than increasing) returns to scale, no productivity effects of reform (for example, of the sort stressed by Melitz 2003) , and no possibility for new markets to be created following reform. As well, there is always the issue of product and regional aggregation: the less disaggregated is the specification of the world economy, the smaller the estimated benefits from reform. This is because there is no accounting for welfare gains from adjustments within aggregated sectors or regions.
As for the effects on poverty, the crude methodology used at the end of the previous 
Conclusions
The findings presented above, aimed at understanding the global economic effects of the agricultural and trade policies remaining in place as of 2004, can be summarized as follows:
• as a share of national income, developing countries would gain nearly twice as much as high-income countries by removing those policies (an average increase of 0.9 percent compared with 0.5 percent for high-income countries, such that international income inequality between countries would improve; • even inter-country inequality (not taking into account differences in the economic size of nations) as measured by the Gini Coefficient would improve slightly even though some developing countries (notably in South Asia) would lose and a few (e.g. Ecuador) would gain many times more than the average; • of those prospective welfare gains from global liberalization, 60 percent would come from agriculture and food policy reform -a striking result given that the shares of agriculture and food in global GDP and global merchandise trade are less than 9 percent; • the contribution of agricultural policy reform to the prospective welfare gain for developing countries is even greater, at 83 percent;
• with full goods trade liberalization, the share of global production of farm products that is exported would rise from 8 to 13 percent excluding intra-EU trade, thereby 'thickening' international food markets and reducing instability of prices and quantities traded in those markets;
• unskilled workers in developing countries -the majority of whom work on farmswould benefit most from reform (followed by skilled workers and then capital owners), with the average change in the real unskilled wage over all developing countries rising 3.8 percent or nearly five times more than the average net income increase in developing countries;
• net farm incomes in developing countries would rise by 5.6 percent, compared with 1.9 percent for non-agricultural value added, suggesting that inequality as between farm and nonfarm households in developing countries would fall;
• by contrast, in high-income countries net farm incomes would fall by 15 percent on average (compared with a slight rise for real non-farm value added), so inequality between farm households in those countries versus in developing countries would reduce substantially; and • extreme poverty (the number of people surviving on less than US$1 a day) in developing countries would drop by 29 million relative to the baseline level of just under one billion, a reduction of 3 percent (and 4 percent when the more moderate US$2 a day poverty level is used).
To get a more precise sense of the inequality and poverty effects within countries, and to explore the extent to which it is own-country as distinct from rest-of world's policies that are doing the harm, requires country case studies using national economy-wide models that are enhanced with detailed earning and spending information of numerous types of urban and rural households. That is the purpose of Parts II, III and IV of this volume. a Using value of production at undistorted prices as weights.
Africa
Source: , based on calculations compiled by Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) . a Small interaction effects are distributed proportionately and numbers are rounded to sum to 100 percent b Percentage in last row refers to the total regional gain relative to the world total. 
